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Abstract—With the primacy of content driving the design
of new network architectures as well as the successful CDN
business model, it is instructive to reconsider problems of content
placement from the context of ISPs. In particular, we focus on
a near-term future where architectural support for content has
become more explicit, or where ISPs have become more proactive
in incorporating content hosting into their business model, or
both. In such a global content oriented network, studying
the economic incentives for ISPs to focus on content placement
and hosting, comes to the fore. In this paper, we consider the
incentives for efficient content placement in a global content
oriented network. We argue for a model of the content placement
decisions made by transit ISPs as a cooperative game, and present
a Shapley-value based mechanism to incentivize ISPs to place
contents efficiently. We argue that with such a mechanism, ISPs
have incentives both to cooperate to maximize surplus, and
to employ placement strategies aligned with the global welfare.
Our simulations give preliminary evidence that our proposed
mechanism could profitably be applied in the near-term Internet,
and based on extrapolations of some widely observed trends,
become even more profitable for ISPs on longer time horizons.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Today’s networking landscape is at an interesting cross-
roads. While it is apparent thatcontentis the dominant factor
driving network usage by end-users, neither the underlying
Internet architecture, nor the business models of most ISPs, are
aligned to provide the most efficient (and profitable) content
delivery mechanisms. As we discuss below, in both contexts,
the reasons appear to largely be historical, and in all likelihood,
this period of non-alignment is a transient one. Therefore,
a key question, and the focus of our work, is to reconsider
the economics of content hosting and content delivery as this
transitionary period comes to a close.
From an architectural perspective, the move towards a
content-driven usage model was never adequately supported
by the underlying host-based paradigms underlying the ar-
chitecture of the Internet. As a result, hosts, applications,
and providers have had to construct workaround solutions
to enable more efficient access to, and delivery of, content.
These range from applications such as peer-to-peer networks
to facilitate content transfers [14], [22] to content delivry
networks controlled by management software to serve hosted
content from locations close to end-hosts [4], [23]. While
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debating the merits of future Internet architectures is beyond
the scope of this paper, it is noteworthy that numerous recent
proposals [20], [15], [5] either elevate content explicitly o
the center of the network, or provide first-class support for
content. These approaches benefit content in many ways, such
as by giving content self-certifying names, by making content
routable, and by making content security intrinsic and explicit.
From an economic perspective, the historical evolution of
how ISPs have handled content has also been a muddied
one. In the past decade, transit ISPs have been caught in
the middle between publishers and consumers of content, and
have largely been ineffective at shaping the various debates
about content (such as network neutrality [11] and content
pricing models [16]). At the same time, while the standard
ISP business model of being paid to transit bits has struggled,
emergent content delivery networks such as Akamai and
Limelight have built massive overlays on top of the ISPs, that
have opportunistically taken advantage of the rise of content,
arguably at the ISPs’ expense. The potential unsustainabilty
of this has recently come into focus, as traditional ISPs such
as AT&T and Level3 have begun to build out their own CDNs,
or have moved closer to a CDN model themselves [1], [2].
At this point, the stage is set for our discussion. We assume
that content will continue to be a dominant type of traffic; that
future network architectures will have evolvednativemethods
o name, route and deliver content; and that future ISPs will
have an opportunity to interact more deeply with content, such
as by content hosting, and content placement.
Today’s Internet is a collection of networks operated by
different ISPs, each operating according to its own best inter-
ests. ISPs are generally taxonomized into three classes [26]:
content, eyeball and transit ISPs, in which content ISPs
specialize in hosting content publishers, eyeball ISPs support
the last-mile delivery to residential users, and transit ISPs
connect content ISPs with eyeball ISPs. The incentive of
placing contents for an eyeball ISP is obvious because it can
avoid paying transit networks by delivering the contents from a
copy placed inside it; strategies for content management inside
a content ISP are also well understood. Our focus is therefore
on incentives for future transit ISPs, where the most significant
bandwidth savings can be achieved (as opposed to the naive
baseline approach of transiting bits).
A key challenge in a content-oriented network is to align
incentives so that efficient content placement can occur more
naturally. After all, content placement benefits transit ISPs
by saving bandwidth in two ways: it enables faster delivery
of content to eyeball networks directly, and it enables more
efficient dispatching of content (recursively) to other transit
ISPs. However, incentives for transit ISPs to place contents
are not always present under today’s Internet infrastructue:
intuitively, due to storage and associated hosting costs, an
ISP would not keep contents for a time span longer than as
needed to receive and forward them. Furthermore, depending
on the structure of their peering agreements, transit ISPs may
find it more profitable to forward, rather than store bits. Also,
digital rights management and network neutrality factor into
ISPs’ decisions regarding the hosting and, albeit indirectly,
prioritization of some content over others. Lastly, transit ISPs
face competition from other entities, for instance, content
delivery networks, that may further perturb their incentives.
We argue that the key to unlock the benefits produced by
content oriented network for transit ISPs is to minimize their
distribution cost to improve performance, offer competitive
price and maximize their surplus. Some degree of cooperation
between the transit ISPs may also be needed (or at least,
continuing to operate as if this is a non-cooperative game
may backfire). In such a setting, mechanisms that appropriately
measure each transit ISP’s contribution in providing content
placement, and compensating them commensurately, is needed
to provide appropriate incentives to transit ISPs.
In this paper we consider such an incentive mechanism. We
model the content placement of transit ISPs as a cooperative
game and apply the Shapley value [24] solution concept to
develop a candidate profit distribution scheme. By analysis
and simulation, we provide preliminary evidence that our
mechanism provides appropriate incentives for transit ISPs to
place contents that optimize the network’s distribution cost;
moreover, these incentives are likely to become stronger ov
time, based on extrapolation of current Internet trends.
II. RELATED WORK
Content placement is a broad area that spans theoretical and
systems research. Instead of cache replacement mechanisms
performed on an isolated cache, this line of research focuses
on strategies and protocols to deploy contents to improve the
performance of the whole system. Since the concept of optimal
data placement was introduced [12], many efforts have been
made in both theoretical and system perspectives. In [6] it was
shown that the general data placement problem is APX-hard,
and approximation algorithms for special cases were present d
and analyzed; in [8] the general data placement problem was
tailored to real system environments and requirements, for
which a constant approximation distributed algorithm was
designed. In [21] the problem of optimally replicating conte ts
for a content distribution network (CDN) was considered, and
several heuristics were presented and evaluated; in [7] theidea
of combining caching and content replication was presented.
With the proposal of content oriented networks, economic
incentives caught the attention of network research community
recently. In [28], it was pointed out that existing incentive
mechanisms were unsatisfactory; in [19] the choices of cache
sizes by individual proxies was modeled as a game, and incen-
tives of optimal resource allocation was discussed; in [3] the
flow of transmitting contents was modeled, in which entities
in different positions were analyzed, and their incentivesof
caching were derived.
The Shapley value is a classical solution concept in cooper-
ative game theory (see Section IV). There have been numerous
research on axiomatization [18] and representation [17] ofthe
Shapley value. Recently, it has been applied to the economic
aspects of networking: in [25] the problem of inter-domain
routing was considered, serving as incentives for ISP to
connect to other ISPs and to route traffic in a better way
than hot-potato routing practiced by most ISPs nowadays;
in [26] it was used to distribute profits among different types
of ISPs, and simple closed-form calculation method for the
Shapley value was presented; in [27] it was used to encourage
participation in peer-assisted services, and a simpler wayto
calculate the Shapley value was shown for this case.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Our model of the overall networked system consists of two
parts: a network model and a model for how ISPs define and
rive utility, revenue, and profits.
A. Network Model
Given a networkG = {V,E}, in which V is the set of
r uters andE is the set of links. Each routerv ∈ V is
annotated with its capacity reserved for contents (µv) and the
ISP it belongs to (Ψv) (a router belongs to one ISP). Each
link is annotated with its distance. For any pair of routersu
andv, there is a pathpu,v to carry traffic fromu to v.
Assume that the set of all ISPs isN , define a coalition
S, ∅ ⊂ S ⊆ N , to be a set of ISPs which collectively
provide transit service. From the topological perspective, th
subnetworkGS induced by a coalitionS is GS = {VS , ES},
in which VS = {v|Ψv ∈ S} andES = {(v1, v2)|v1, v2 ∈ VS}.
Let RS(u, v) = 1 if v is reachable fromu in GS , i.e. there
exi ts a sequence of routers< u = n0, n1, . . . , nm = v >
such that(ni, ni+1) ∈ ES for all 0 ≤ i < m (and the path
from u to v in GS is denoted aspSu,v); otherwiseR
S(u, v) = 0.
Let C denote the set of contents to be transited. Denote a
transmission byT cs,t, of contentc ∈ C from sources to client
t. Let νc denote the size of contentc. A transmission happens
as follows: a request is sent fromt to s alongpSt,s requesting
a contentc. c may be placed at some routers along the path
based on the content placements of routers. Assume routerr
has the content (r = s if c is not placed alongpSt,s), the request
i served fromr to t.
B. Utility Model
We model three parts of utility: revenue of transmissions,
transmission costs and storage costs for replicated contents.
Note that these components are defined for valid transmission ,
i.e. T cs,t such thatR
S(s, t) = 1, otherwise they are0.
revenue: assume that for every transmissionT cs,t, a certain
amount of revenuercs,t is generated to the coalition involved
in the transmission. The amount of revenue is the result of the
negotiation between the coalition of transit ISPs and content,
eyeball networks. In the short term, it is independent of where
the content is actually delivered. However, in the long run it
depends on where contents are delivered: when a coalition
decides how much it should charge for a transmission and
making itself competitive in the market, cost associated tothe
transmission is an important factor to be considered.
transmission cost: if a transmissionT cs,t is served at router
r, we model the transmission costσ1 as proportional to “bit-
miles”, a reflection of the bandwidth-delay product of the
transmission that takes place:σ1(T cs,t) = νcl(r, t), in which
l(r, t) is the network distance from routerr to t along path
pSr,t. We omit the cost of transmitting the initial request of the
content as the request is relatively small in data size.
storage cost: Assume that each router updates its content
placement at every time intervalτ . Let binary variableP τ (c, r)
denote whether contentc is placed at router during τ . The
storage cost ofc during periodτ is στ2 (c) = βP
τ (c, r)νc,
β ∈ R. 1
Now we define the utility of a coalitionS. Let TS be the
set of transmissions served byS andC be the set of contents
in these transmissions. The transmissions are served within











in which α, β ∈ R.
We now formulate the key problem in this work, the content
placement problem:
Problem 1: The content placement problemfacing a coali-
tion S (or as a special case, an ISP) is to place contents
(determiningP (c, r)) for eachr ∈ VS such thatV (S) is max-
imized, while respecting capacity constraints, i.e.∀v ∈ VS ,∑
c∈C P (c, v)νc ≤ µv.
In a centralized sense, this problem is NP-hard and hard
to approximate [6]. Our focus, however, is not an optimal
solution to this problem. Instead we reason about it from
the standpoint of cooperative games, and consider how the
use of different heuristics and coalitional strategies could be
employed by sets of strategic players in practice.
IV. CONTENT PLACEMENT AS A COOPERATIVEGAME
In this section, we model content placement as a cooperative
game across ISPs. We begin with the necessary background for
our approach: the framework for cooperative games, various
definitions used in defining solution concepts, and the Shapley
value profit sharing mechanism. We then demonstrate how to
apply these methods to the problem setting in our model.
A. Background: Cooperative Games and the Shapley Value
In a cooperative game framework, a set ofn players form
coalitions S ⊆ 2n that cooperatively generate profits and
1Note that since the utility is additive over time intervals, we consider
transmissions within one time interval and dropτ in the utility function.
share those profits amongst the members of the coalition.
A valuation functionV maps a coalition to a real-valued
utility V : 2n → R. The profits need to be shared fairly
among the coalition members. An axiomatic definition of
equitability and a mechanism for fairly dividing payoffs was
the solution concept developed by Shapley in 1958 [24]. While
Shapley’s properties were different from the three listed blow,
these three are more intuitive and lead to the same unique
mechanism [18].
Letting ϕi(N,V ) denote playeri’s share of profit in a set
of playersN where the utility function isV , the axioms are:
1) Efficiency:
∑
i∈N ϕi(N,V ) = V (N).
2) Symmetry: If for all S ⊆ N \{i, j}, V (S∪{i}) = V (S∪
{j}), thenϕi(N,V ) = ϕj(N,V ).
3) Strong monotonicity: Given (N,V ) and (N,W ), if for
all S ⊆ N \ {i}, V (S ∪ {i}) − V (S) ≥ W (S ∪ {i}) −
W (S), thenϕi(N,V ) ≥ ϕi(N,W ).
Intuitively, these properties ensure that the mechanism
should distribute all the profit, it should be fair in the sens
that players with the same contribution to the coalition receive
the same profit; and finally, contributing more to the coalition
leads to more profit for a player. Mathematically, the Shapley
value is defined as each player’s average marginal contribution






(V (S(π, i) ∪ {i}) − V (S(π, i))) (2)
where S(π, i) denotes the subset of players precedingin
orderingπ, Π is the total orderings ofN , V (.) is the profit
generated by the corresponding set of players.
B. The Content Placement Game
Returning to our problem, intuitively, an ISP benefits from
participating in coalitions for cooperative content placement
because:
1) An ISP can utilize the replicated contents at other ISPs’
routers to serve its customers (eyeball networks).
2) One copy of replicated content can serve multiple trans-
missions, thus utilizing the storage to the best extent.
3) Cooperative content placement allows improved content
layout, prevents less valued replication and enables more
contents to be placed in the network.
Framed as a cooperative game, each individual member in
the coalition strategizes on how to place contents according
to the utility function described and defined in Section III.
We definecontent placement of ISPi in coalition S, denoted
by PSi , as the contents selected by ISPi: P (c, r) for each
r ∈ VS such thatΨr = i. Among all possible placements
PSi , we define thecoalitionally optimal placement strategyof
ISP i, denoted byP̂Si , as the placement that maximizesV (S).
Similarly, we definePS and P̂S to be the content placement
of coalition S, and the coalitionally optimal such placement,
respectively.
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S′ = {AS 1, AS 2} S′ = {AS 1, AS 3} S′ = {AS 1, AS 2, AS 3} Shapley Value
Case Replicated atR3 Replicated atR4 Replicated atR2 (2.33, 1.33, 1.33)
(1) V (S′) = 2 V (S′) = 2 V (S′) = 5
Case Replicated atR3 Replicated atR4 Replicated atR3 andR4 (2, 1, 1)
(2) V (S′) = 2 V (S′) = 2 V (S′) = 4
Case Replicated atR3 Replicated atR4 Replicated atR3 andR4 (2, 1, 1)
(3) V (S′) = 2 V (S′) = 2 V (S′) = 4
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF CONTENT PLACEMENT STRATEGIES AND THESHAPLEY VALUES
C. Content Placement Strategies
We now briefly consider some candidate heuristic content
placement strategies that ISPs might employ, and outline
algorithms to determine content placement.
1) Content Placement Strategies:Consider the following
intuitive content placement strategies, in which we use the
term candidate seto denote the content feasible for a given
ISP to place.
Coalitionally Optimal Placement: Each ISP’s content selec-
tion is aligned with the optimal strategy of the coalition, i.e.
if contentc is placed atR in P̂S , it is also atR in P̂Si .
Aggressive Placement: Each ISP replicates contents if and
only if doing so reduces transit cost. Any request reaching
a router that has a copy of the content terminates at that
point. Note that if a request is served at a Content-Store, it
will not pass through subsequent routers along the path. If
every router performs aggressive placement, the optimization
decision becomes more myopic: for instance, a router as the
potential role of an internal distribution node may find placing
some contents not worthy enough due to aggressive placement
of other routers, which choose to place the contents albeit with
a relatively small reduction of transit cost. The system ends
up with sub-optimal placement for these contents.
Myopically Selfish Placement: candidate set of ISPi only
contains transmissions whose destination routers belong ti
(in the context of a transit network, a destination router isthe
router through which the content is delivered to the eyeballnet-
work). This strategy is similar to today’s application-specific
content delivery approach: an application often rents servers
and selects contents to be placed at those servers.
2) Content Placement Algorithms:We start with central-
ized approaches to determine content placements. Assume that
each router has information on sizes and frequencies of the
contents that pass through it, i.e. the aggregated access deman
for each content is known.
Optimal and Selfish Placements: consider the optimization
problem stated in Section III. Since it is APX-hard, a natural
approach is to employ a hill-climbing heuristics to improve
the utility of content placement. We start with no content
in the whole network and apply iterative best-response. We
consider two operations in each iteration: (1) associatinga d
(2) disassociating a content with a router. the former for every
content in every router’s candidate set and the latter for eve y
placed content in the network. In each iteration, we choose the
operation that maximizes the reduction in cost, until no such
move exists. Note that for each router, there may be many
transmissions associated with a content, in which case the to al
cost changes in proportion to the number of transmissions it
services, but the storage cost is counted once.
For optimal placement, a content is in the candidate set of
a router if the following criteria are met:(1) the router is on
the path of the transmission;(2) no prior hops have placed
the content;(3) the router has sufficient capacity to place the
content. For myopically selfish placement, the destinationof
the transmission must additionally belong to that same ISP.
Aggressive Placementis more naturally a decentralized
process: if synchronization is assumed, the process of each
content request traveling from the source to the destinatio
can be easily simulated. When a request reaches a router,
the router evaluates the benefit of placing the content. Each
router’s objective is to fill up its capacity and achieve the
largest benefit, in the spirit of a Knapsack problem.
3) Example of Content Placement Strategies and the Shap-
ley Values: Table 1 shows an example of the Shapley values
under different content placement strategies in a very simple
network setting. The network topology is shown in the figure
(left) with AS numbers, router identifiers and link lengths.
There are two transmissions of the same file with unit size,
one fromR1 to R3 and the other fromR1 to R4. We assume
that each transmission generates a revenue of5 f r the whole
network. The storage cost at every router is3. Let α = β = 1.
Assume that all routers have sufficient space to replicate the
file. Consider the cases in which ISPs employ(1) optimal
placement,(2) aggressive placement and(3) selfish placement.
The placement of each case, the utility of each subset (with
positive utility) and the Shapley value for each ISP are shown.
Consider the above strategies in the case of the coalition
consisted of all ISPs: the optimal placement is to place the
content atR2 to achieve a total profit of5 (10 total revenue,
less3 for storage at routerR2 and1 each for transmitting to
R3 andR4 respectively); in the case of aggressive placement,
consider the request fromR3: since compared to not doing
so, replicating the content atR3 reduces the distribution cost
by 1, R3 chooses to place the content; same for the request
from R4; in the case of selfish placement, sinceR2 does not
consider contents that are not delivered to its ISP (AS1), only
R3 and R4 consider placing the content, so the result is the
same with the case of aggressive placement strategy.
D. Equilibrium of the Content Placement Game
In the example shown in Table 1, each ISP maximizes its
profit by employing optimal placement strategy. The following
generalized theorem can be proved following from the Shapley
value solution concept:
Theorem 1:Under the Shapley value mechanism, the opti-
mal placement strategy of coalition̂PS is a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof: By contradiction. Assume that ASi can make
more profit by deviating from optimal placement strategy,










i denotes the content placement ofi aligned with P̂
S′ ,
the optimal placement strategy ofS′, P
′
i denotes the content
placement strategy ASi deviates to, andV (S, Pi) denotes the
utility of S if AS i employs strategyPi.
This contradicts the fact that̂PS
′
is the optimal strategy for
S′.
E. Decomposition of the Shapley Value
Returning to the utility functionV (S): becausel(s, t) =
l(s, r) + l(r, t), V (S) can be written into two components:














VX(S) can be construed as the revenue of coalitionS
without content placement,VY (S) is the reduction of cost if
content placement is implemented. The corresponding Shapley
value can also be decomposed into two parts (directly from
the additivity property of Shapley value [24]):ϕi(S, VX) and




To instantiate the network system in Section III, we need
to provide a network topology and representative workloads.
We choose as follows:
1) Network Topology: Router-level ISP topologies are
widely viewed as proprietary, and are not publicly available.
We therefore use datasets measured by RocketFuel [29], a
project that infers router-level topologies from measurements.
There are 6 major US ISPs in the RocketFuel dataset: ASes
6461, 3967, 3356, 1239, 2914 and 7018. In the RocketFuel
dataset, each router has the following information: geograph-
ical location and measured connections to other routers (of
the ISP it belongs to and other ISPs). We coalesce routers
in a certain geographical location into Points of Presence
(PoPs). The capacity of a PoP is proportional to the number
of routers in it. An inter-PoP connection (a link between a
pair of PoP) exists if a connection exists between two routers
located in these two PoPs respectively. Note that both links
inside a single ISP and AS-AS links are contained. Link
distance is approximated by the Euclidean distance between
the geographical locations of its two endpoints. Network
distance between a pair of PoPs is the sum of the distances of
links that constitute the path.
Paths are calculated for each possible coalition using stan-
dard routing algorithms: Dijkstra’s algorithm for intra-domain
routing; standard BGP preference for inter-domain routing: a
path crosses as few ISPs as possible. Among paths that cross
the fewest ISPs, the path with the shortest network distanceis
chosen. Now we have a topology for each possible coalition, in
which each PoP is annotated with its affiliation of an ISP, its
capacity, geographical location, connections to its neighbors
and routes to all other PoPs.
2) Workload: The basic information needed to drive our
pilot study is an aggregated workload within a certain time
span, i.e. a set of transmissions of files. Furthermore, we need
to associate these transmissions to the PoPs. Among many
workload characterization efforts, we chose ProWGen[9], a
web workload generator tailored for the study of cache perfor-
mance at servers. For parameter settings, we used the empirical
settings from Web traffic characterization: file sizes follow a
Lognormal Pareto distribution (the percentage of files at the
tail is 30%, the heavy tail index is1.1); access frequencies
follow a Zipf distribution (the Zipf slope is0.75); frequency
and file size is uncorrelated. An access of a file constitutes a
transmission.
We associate the generated transmissions to PoPs in the
following way: in each ISP we choose a PoP as a publisher.
Each file is hosted by a publisher at random. For each file, we
distribute its access to clients: each time a client (a PoP) other
than the publisher is chosen randomly along with its access
frequency from this client, and this frequency is deducted
from the total number of access for this file. This process is
repeated until the number of access for this file is0. Finally,
we set a targeted number of transmissions for each ISP which
is proportional to its size. If the number of transmissions
allocated to an ISP exceeds this target, client will not be chosen
from it.
3) Parameter Settings of Our Model:As shown in Sec-
tion IV-B, the Shapley value of an ASi can be decomposed to
two parts:ϕi(VX), which is independent of content placement;
and ϕi(VY ), which depends upon placement. In this section
we focus onϕi(VY ) for all ISPs. So the choice ofα does not
have influence on ISPs’ content placements. We will show
the effects ofβ in our simulations. In each setting we run
the content selection algorithm for each content placement
strategy, calculate the utility defined in Section III and each
ISP’s share of profit.
B. Comparisons of Different Placement Strategies
Figure 1 shows the profits of different placement strategies
fo each ISP. In these plots, the sum of profits across ISPs can
be interpreted as the overall system utility, or equivalently, the
overall cost-effectiveness of the network. In (a) we contrast the
profit each ISP can make alone with that in a collaboration in






























(a) Cooperative and individual profit (b) Unilateral deviation from optimal (c) ISPs employ the same strategy


































(a) Total utility (b) Shapley value of AS 3356 (c) Shapley value of AS 2914



































(a) Total utility (b) Shapley value of AS 3356 (c) Shapley value of AS 2914
Fig. 3. Profits whenp changes
the Shapley values when an ISP unilaterally deviates from the
optimal placement strategy (yet shares in the Shapley payout);
in (c) we show the Shapley values when all ISPs employ
the same placement strategy. From these plots, cooperationis
clearly beneficial, and coalitionally optimal placements derive
the most surplus. When all ISPs employ the same strategy,
aggressive placement is better than selfish placement becaus
of its inherent adaptivity to minimize costs. In comparison, if
ISPs unilaterally deviate from optimal placement, the distur-
bance to the optimal placement solution caused by aggressive
placement is significant and harmful. The case of selfish
placement is the opposite: when only one ISP is selfish, the
overall content placement is still near optimal; while whenall
ISPs are selfish, the decrease of overall utility, as well as each
ISP’s share, is more significant.
In our model,β is a parameter that describes the relative
cost of storage. In Figure 2 we show the total utility of the
network and the Shapley values of two representative ISPs
(a large AS:2914 and a smaller AS:3356) under different
strategies with different settings ofβ. In each experiment all
ISPs employ the same strategy. We can see that althoughβ is
a factor that influences profits, the profits stabilize whenβ is
small enough. This is evidenced by cases whereβ = 1 and
β = 0.125: some contents are not frequently transmitted, or
the source-destination pairs do not make content placement
along the path valuable. We can also see that if storage is
expensive, it is particularly unfavorable to employ aggressive
placement: from whole network’s perspective, the precious
resources are not utilized properly due to the aggressive ISP’s
content selection. However, for selfish placement, when the
storage cost is high, it is harder to contribute, and the lossof
profit is less significant.
C. Future Trends
We now return to our initial motivation, the future Internet.
While we cannot predict the future, several basic and long-
observed trends, such as Moore’s law, are likely to continue
to apply. We consider how our incentive mechanism would
perform, in a hypothetical world in which those trends con-
tinue, relative to today.
Although Moore’s law was first used to specifically describe
microprocessor transistor counts, it has many counterparts in
the digital technology world: related to our model, storagecost
halves, transmission cost halves, and capacity doubles. Also
these laws lead to the prevalence of large files. While this is
a complicated setting, most scenarios are straightforwardand
can be reduced to the scenario in which workload changes
while other factors remain. We focus on such a setting:
changingp, the percentage of the files that are in the tail of
the Lognormal Pareto distribution of file sizes.
We show the overall utility and the Shapley values of two
ISPs in Figure 3 as we varyp. Generally, asp increases,
ISPs get more profit by optimally placing contents, and the
difference between optimal placement and other strategies
increase. Our intuitive explanation is that when more large
files are frequently accessed, placing them optimally becomes
more profitable.
VI. D ISCUSSION
Looking forward, several important challenges with our
proposed mechanism remain. Key among these are how to
incorporate these methods into an ISP’s infrastructure while
retaining appropriate economic incentives, and dealing with
additional technical issues. We discuss these now.
A. Application Architectures
In today’s Internet, ISPs often employ caching: temporar-
ily storing contents to facilitate future transmissions. In the
context of CDNs, providers go beyond caching to content
placement via replication. We argue that combining the ideas
from these two lines is feasible and beneficial. Instead of
driven only by instantaneous user requests, ISPs should
consider the longer-term value of content placement. From
a system-wide perspective, efficient content placement can
complement caching mechanisms by providing hints, and can
potentially limit churn associated with frequent updates caused
by caching. Indeed, a similarly integrated approach appears as
the Content-Store proposed in [20]: buffer memory used to
replicate content to facilitate content-based routing. Informed
by which contents benefit most from replication, each router
can optimize the Content Store accordingly. It is feasible
because it does not require significantly more computation
than current content delivery approaches (arguably less);it is
beneficial because it is aligned with ISP’s incentives in both
profits and performance.
One possible application architecture is that a coalitional
entity, similar in spirit to a CDN of today, calculates the
optimal content placement periodically and sends the results
as caching hints to either every router or to a delegate for
every ISP. Shapley values can be calculated by this entity.
Note that there may be many practical considerations be-
yond our simplified model, but can be considered under the
same framework: for instance, in addition to content place-
ment, an ISP may strategically determine cache size at each
router to reduce its operational cost; an ISP may also engineer
its traffic to route contents towards the desired routers to adapt
to such optimal cache sizes. These are more complicated opti-
mization problems considered by ISPs, however, the incentiv
mechanisms for them to place contents optimally remain.
B. Decentralizing Content Selection
Another possible but challenging approach is to decentralize
content selection process and the associated profit reporting
and calculation mechanism. The major issue is dependency:
assume that a transmission follows the pathu1 ∼ u2 ∼ u3.
The content selection ofu2 depends on that ofu1: when
content requests are served byu1, they will not reachu2.
However, there may be cases in which this greedy choice is
suboptimal; moreover, time synchronization issues can lead to
race conditions, in which case routers’ content selectionsmay
need to be done interdependently.
Based on the assumption that inputs used to make content
selection do not change dramatically during a relatively short
period of time, periodic synchronization can be used to update
the inputs: for each content, the router that has the content
sends a message towards the publisher. The message has the
information on how many requests were served and how much
cost was reduced since last synchronization. Upstream routers
can then easily coordinate with downstream routers as to
placements that maximize cost reductions. Note that when this
mechanism is applied across coalitions, truthful information
reporting from participating ISPs is required.
Finally, if content selection is decentralized, the placement
still needs to be reported to a central entity, which gathersthe
information and calculates the Shapley value for each ISP; or
the Shapley value is calculated recursively amongst ISPs. The
former approach is contingent on truthful information report-
ing; the latter approach is preferable, but seems challenging.
In the context of our problem, although the Shapley value can
be defined recursively [17], it is still defined over all possible
subsets and requires significant calculation.
C. Other Practical Issues
1) Shapley Value Calculations:It was widely understood
that computing the Shapley value exactly requires calculating
the contribution of each ISP on every possible ordering of
every subset, which has exponential time complexity. If a
central entity is dedicated to it, it is not infeasible because
in the core of the Internet the number of transit ISPs is
relatively small. Furthermore, there are several ongoing efforts
on approximating the Shapley value in polynomial time based
on linear approximation [13] or sampling [10] that may prove
suitable for our work.
2) Coalitions on Today’s Internet:Our simulation showed
the case in which the network is comprised of several core
transit networks. In practice, a coalition does not necessarily
have to be the whole network: depending on the workload and
network structure, some workloads on some ISPs do not have
material influence on profit made by other ISPs with different
workloads. Also, some ISPs can be delegates of their customer
stub ISPs. These cut points also help reducing the complexity
of calculating the Shapley value.
There is also a potential gap between coalitions and the cur-
rent bilateral peering structure. In the core of the Internet, most
ISPs form peer-to-peer relationship to exchange bulk traffic,
which is not necessarily geared towards profit maximization.
However, most stub networks connect to the Internet through
a provider ISP, which makes profits from its customers. The
interplay between coalition-induced profit, customer-induced
profit, and bilateral agreements needs to be studied.
3) Information Reporting:In order to assess the Shapley
value of an ISP, its internal router-level information is need d.
ISPs typically do not disclose this type of information to
the full level. In the context of our problem, the information
needed is: the capacity of Content-Store enabled routers (or
data centers near routers) and network distances between each
pair of them. An ISP can make some structurally important
routers Content-Store disabled and increase the difficultyof
inferring router-level topology by pairwise information.
The Shapley value mechanism and the distributed content
selection also require truthful information. Audit trail mecha-
nisms need to be designed to prevent ISPs from misreporting.
Promisingly, future content oriented networks have focused
both on intrinsically secure content delivery design, and also
hold out the promise of facilitating manageable accounting
mechanisms [20], [15].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed employing a Shapley value
based profit distribution mechanism to incentivize ISPs to
cooperatively place contents inside a content oriented net-
work. We showed that our mechanism has promise for utility
maximization via simulations drawn from traces driven from
measured network topologies and representative workloads.
We discussed issues regarding deploying mechanisms such
as this on the Internet, from the favorable: technological and
network-architectural trends, to the more challenging, such as
economic considerations. We believe that progress on those
problems will advance the economic incentives of ISPs as
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